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Poverty, Agency and Resistance in the
Future of International Law: an
African perspective
OBIORA CHINEDU OKAFOR
ABSTRACT This article enquires into the likely posture of future international

law with respect to African peoples. It does so by focusing on three of the
most important issues that have deﬁned, and are likely to continue to deﬁne,
international law’s engagement with Africans. These are: the grinding poverty
in which most Africans live, the question of agency in their historical search
for dignity, and the extent to which these African peoples can eﬀectively resist
externally imposed frameworks and measures that have negative eﬀects on
their social, economic and political experience. International law’s future
posture in these respects is considered through an examination of concrete
debates relating to agricultural subsidies, debt usury and relief therefrom, and
the relocation of framework socioeconomic governance of almost every
African state to external institutions. Insights about what the future holds for
the eﬀectiveness of Third World resistance are derived from a consideration of
the broad lessons that can be learned from the successes or failures of some
past Third World struggles.
The theme of this special issue invites contributors to envision, from varying
perspectives, the likely orientation of future international law’s engagement
with the Third World.1 In this article I seek to engage this theme from an
African perspective. My analysis is informed as well by the insights generated
by critical Third World approaches to international law (TWAIL).2 However,
without a crystal ball, I can only attempt, as best as I can, to read this
normative future from the transcripts of past and current diplomatic dramas
and the narratives of historically continuous existential struggles. Diﬃcult as
this task is, the historical continuities and discontinuities that meet the

trained (TWAIL) eye provide an elevated platform from which to gaze into the
horizon, and to make out, in outline, a picture of what seems to lie in store
for most African peoples in the future of international law.
The three main questions that are dealt with in this article all relate to the
extent to which future international law can reasonably be expected to
promote much more eﬀectively the well-being of African peoples. The ﬁrst
such question is the extent to which future international law can be
reasonably expected to curtail its signiﬁcant role in the generation and
maintenance of conditions of poverty on the African continent. Second, to
what extent is this future normative order likely to permit and/or promote
the exercise of much more local agency in the governance of African
societies? Third, to what extent is this future order likely to allow African
peoples the spaces from which they can resist much more eﬀectively the
various aspects of our global circumstance that most of them perceive as
unfair to them?
Three of the concepts that feature prominently in the questions articulated
above require some explanation, or at least a measure of location. These
concepts are: poverty, agency and resistance. Let me begin by explaining
brieﬂy what I mean by the term poverty. While one of the World Bank’s key
short hands for measuring poverty—living on less than one dollar a day—is
now widely accepted and used as a key measure of that condition around the
world,3 as I use the term poverty in this article it is meant to include any
incidence of the fundamental deprivation, or the serious lack, of basic needs

(such as food, water, shelter, education, clothing and essential medicines).
This understanding of poverty does not of course conﬂict with the World
Bank’s overall approach to poverty reduction.4 Yet, without enacting what
Baxi has called ‘a hierarchy of pain and suﬀering’, the understanding of
poverty that is suggested here largely avoids the under-inclusion of signiﬁcant
forms of grinding poverty that may not be captured by the day ‘dollar-a-day’
measure. It also eschews the over-inclusion of some whose suﬀering pales in
comparison with the kind of suﬀering that is intended to be addressed by the
term ‘poverty’.5
As used in this article, the term agency ‘refers not to the intentions
people have in doing things but to their capability of doing those things in
the ﬁrst place’.6 In articulating this understanding of agency, I am obviously
indebted to Anthony Giddens’ much-referenced work on ‘structuration’.7
Thus, as Seckinelgin has correctly noted, the

concept

of

agency

is

fruitfully understood as the capability to deal with an issue, question or
problem.8
For both Richard Falk and Balakrishnan Rajagopal, it is to a
combination of state action and social movement protests (not one or the
other) that one must turn to understand the meaning of resistance in the
international legal order.9 It is this approach that has shaped my
understanding and use of the term here as encompassing both resistance
by African states and social movement action within and across state

boundaries. That approach has also shaped my conception of the nature of
the targets to which such resistance ought to be directed (in appropriate
cases) as inclusive, not just of powerful states but also of certain non-state
global actors like the key international ﬁnancial institutions (IFIs) and many
transnational corporations (TNCs). My treatment of resistance in this article
has also been heavily inﬂuenced by Upendra Baxi’s seminal work on social
movements and human rights, especially the distinctions he draws between
‘good’ and ‘bad’ social movements.10

The focus in this article on poverty, agency and resistance is justiﬁed by
the salience and signiﬁcance of all three concepts in the historical struggles
of most African peoples for human dignity. First, it is now almost trite to
say that the reduction of poverty on the African continent is key to the
success of their overall struggle for dignity.11 Yet it bears emphasis here to
note that even today ‘40% of all Africans survive on less than a dollar a
day’ and far more than that number eke out a living in an atmosphere of
grinding material deprivation.12 The distributive dimension of this incidence
of poverty in most African states is increasingly acknowledged by
important decision makers. For example, the Nigerian government’s
National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) clearly
states that ‘income inequality in Nigeria is very high’.13 Similarly, the
World Bank has recently shown that widespread and deep inequity in
Africa and the rest of the Third World is a key reason for the continued

prevalence of poverty in those areas of the world.14 And the EU is
convinced that, ‘while several African countries have managed to record
impressive economic growth’, the ‘highly unequal distribution of income [in
most African countries] often prevents this growth from having a positive
impact on poverty levels’.15 Second, the importance of the question of
agency in Africa’s historical search for dignity is evident in the EU’s recent
acknowledgement that ‘development policies and strategies cannot be
imposed from the outside’ and that ‘the EU should consistently and
collectively support Africa and country-owned strategies and policies’.16
What is left unsaid by the EU is that, at least for now, this approach to
African agency is manifested more at the level of rhetoric and desire, and
less at the level of practice. The much-discussed history of the implementation of structural adjustment strategies and other such policies in
Africa bears eloquent testimony to the veracity of this claim.17 Third, given
the prevalence of imposed governance policies in Africa, it is hardly
controversial to claim that the capacity of African peoples to resist these
impositions and rewrite the relevant global rules will in itself be a highly
important factor in the success or failure of each of their struggles for
dignity.18
The rest of the article is divided into four parts. The ﬁrst three sections will
deal with the questions articulated in the foregoing paragraphs, while the last,
concluding, section will provide an overall assessment of future international

law’s likely posture(s) with regard to the need to radically reduce poverty in
most African societies, to recognise and promote local agency in almost all
these places, and to permit and more meaningfully internalise African
resistance to non-favourable global rules.

On poverty
Any credible consideration of the likely extent of future international law’s
commitment to the signiﬁcant reduction of poverty on the African continent
must begin from a serious analysis of the existing evidence in this regard. It
must therefore proceed from the recognition of the historical reluctance of
the international legal order to promote actively the socioeconomic wellbeing of most Africans. As the late Ivan Head once noted:

That international law can, indeed should, contribute to development, is not in
question, but it must be remembered that some of the applications of legal
principles, designed as they often were in the industrialised countries, are not
always in the interest of developing countries.19

If, as Ivan Head has shown us, international law has been traditionally
insensitive to the cause of poverty reduction (a key objective of development),
how likely is it that future international law will become more sensitive in this
respect? Will this future normative order be able to contribute more

eﬀectively to the urgent need to grow real incomes and radically increase
access to other socioeconomic beneﬁts on the African continent? In a similar
vein will it be able to contribute to the imperative of enthroning far more
socioeconomic equity within African states? Two lines of inquiry are
suggested by the above questions: the ﬁrst one relates to future international
law’s probable relevance or irrelevance to the struggle for increased real
incomes and other socioeconomic beneﬁts in Africa. The other concerns that
future order’s likely attitude to the search for much greater socioeconomic
equity within African states. While the investigation of both of these
questions is important in order to fully appreciate the likely nature of future
international law’s relationship to the struggle to reduce poverty on the
continent, space does not allow the consideration of both questions here.
Thus only the ﬁrst sub-question will be examined.
That sub-question will be considered by engaging in a relatively general
discussion of the question of the possible elimination of the trade-distorting
agricultural subsidies that many of the far richer countries of the North have
for decades maintained in the global trading system, while ensuring that most
African countries eﬀectively open up most of their own markets to imports
from these far richer countries.20 This is an issue that is governed by the
World Trade Organization’s (WTO) General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade
(GATT).21 Given the fact that a sizeable majority of African people live in rural
areas and depend for their subsistence on agriculture,22 and considering that a

very large number of African countries are as reliant for their national incomes
on the export of their agricultural produce to markets in the geopolitical
North,23 any factor that negatively aﬀects the volume and prices of these
exports to the North poses a highly signiﬁcant obstacle to the struggle to
substantially increase the incomes of African peoples and to thereby reduce the
incidence of poverty on the African continent. As such, the relative failure, at
least to date, of international (trade) law to deal eﬀectively with these tradedistorting agricultural subsidies has made an important negative contribution
to the continuing poverty of far too many Africans.24 The extent of this
agricultural subsidy has been estimated at $300 billion (a massive ﬁgure that
basically equals the total economic output from all of Africa).25 Yet these
subsidies have survived in large measure despite the fact that almost all of
the farms in the North that beneﬁt from such subsidies are really marginal to
the economic output and prosperity of the relevant countries (largely the EU,
the USA and Japan).26 By contrast, as has been argued above, agriculture
remains central to the economic survival of most African peoples.
It is of course important to realise that the maintenance of a national
agricultural productive capacity is as sensitive an issue in the First World as it
is in Africa. Many Northern countries have expressed the fear that following
an anti-subsidy path might lead to the devastation of their agricultural
sectors. As such there is a political cost involved for the relevant countries of
the North should they support the implementation of international trade

rules that require the elimination of subsidies. However, apart from the fact
that the removal of the relevant subsidies will not necessarily lead to the
devastation of every kind of agricultural endeavour in these countries, given
the overall scheme of international trade, these countries of the North cannot
continue to maintain these kinds of subsidy while ensuring that the far
weaker African countries open their own markets and remove subsidies in
areas that are as, or even more, sensitive to their economies.
While the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) for 2006 under the aegis of
the

WTO

signals the growing sensitivity of international (trade) law in this

important area,27 it is hardly clear from any of the discussions on the
reduction of these agricultural subsidies that it will, in the near or mediumterm future lead to their total elimination, or to a signiﬁcant upsurge in the
exportation of agricultural produce from the relevant parts of Africa to the
countries of the North. What is more, even the partial changes that have been
proposed have taken so long to negotiate and congeal, much less to
implement, that a measure of pessimism only seems realistic. This less-thanoptimistic reading of international law’s likely future posture in this respect is
reinforced by the informed realisation that the snail’s pace at which the
negotiations and implementation of the relevant agreements have so far
proceeded essentially reﬂects, and bows to, the huge South – North power
asymmetries of the global order. Had the relevant subsidies been handed out
by the much weaker Third World countries, and had the North found itself
demanding more market access via the elimination of these subsidies, it is

highly unlikely that the negotiation and implementation of a remedial
agreement would have taken so long. Nevertheless, it is still a commendable
development that the negotiations have made some headway at all, however
minor or modest its progress thus far.
Thus, as much as these developments indicate the possibility of change in
the orientation of future international law’s engagement with African
peoples, what is most evident from these developments is the law’s historical
tendency to reﬂect and respond more eﬀectively to the economic worries and
demands of the North, and to be at the same time much less responsive to the
socioeconomic challenges facing most African peoples. Since the rapid
reduction of the agricultural subsidies discussed above would lead to
reasonably increased incomes for a great many African farmers and their
states, the likelihood that future international law will contribute much more
eﬀectively to the urgent need to grow incomes and increase access to other
socioeconomic beneﬁts on the African continent is called into question by the
evident reluctance of the much more powerful countries of the North to
eliminate these subsidies. While other factors will of course help determine
any increases in the real income of African peoples, this allegorical story
(about international law’s relative insensitivity to the necessity for the
elimination of the Northern practice of oﬀering extensive ﬁnancial subsidies
to their farmers, and about the ways in which that behaviour helps maintain
the poverty that is rife in many African states) is highly instructive. The
continuity of this sort of trend over almost all of modern history and the snail

speed of current international legal reform in the area does not inspire much
conﬁdence in the likelihood that future international law will contribute
eﬀectively to the reduction of poverty on the African continent.
As discussed, there is little in reality that suggests that the more powerful
states will in the near or medium-term future be willing to make the kinds of
fundamental economic concessions to African states in areas such as the
elimination of agricultural subsidies without extracting from these African
countries certain countervailing concessions (which will tend to detract from
the gains of the anticipated cuts in these Northern subsidies). History teaches
us that the more economically powerful states, indeed almost all states,
hardly ever give up their more powerful positions in a willing fashion. As
such, barring any sudden seismic shifts in the conﬁguration of global power,
or in the receptiveness of the public and/or ruling elites in the more powerful
states of the North to more far-reaching pro-global equity ideas, these more
powerful states are likely to continue to act in ways that essentially preserve
rather than reform the economic status quo. This is not to say that these
states will not make any concessions whatsoever to African states. They will
certainly make many such concessions over the near and medium-term future
of international law. What one is much less sanguine about is the
preparedness and ability of any of these states of the North to make the
kind of radical concessions that would fundamentally threaten the privileged
socioeconomic positions of almost all of their citizenry vis-a`-vis the vast
majority of African peoples.

On agency
To what extent is future international law likely to permit or promote the
exercise of more African agency in the governance of African societies, while
restricting to a minimum the current overbearing role of outsiders in the
constitution of these societies? If, as Giddens has shown, the term agency is
best understood as the capability of doing things, this question can also be
framed in terms of the extent to which future international law is likely to
permit or promote the capability of African peoples to chart their own
futures and to self-constitute.28
Here again, a credible inquiry into this question must begin with an attempt
to understand the historical tendencies of international law in this connection.
Are there historical continuities that meet the eye in this respect? And what
kinds of discontinuities, if any, can be observed? As Antony Anghie’s work
has shown, despite the discontinuities that exist in the exact forms and
techniques that were deployed, there is indeed a historical continuity from at
least the 16th century onward in international law’s tolerance of, if not active
support for, the negation and/or erasure of Third World (including of course
African) agency.29 At root this denial of African agency has taken the form, in
each era of global interrelations, of an assault on the capacity of African
peoples to govern their own lives and chart their own futures. In the mid-19th
to the mid-20th century, this negation of African agency was more formal,
extensive and suﬀocating than it currently is.30 This was the era of formal

European colonial rule over Africa, in which nearly every aspect of the life of
almost every African society became marked to some extent by a coercively
(and often brutally) superimposed colonial order.31 Quite obviously, that
speciﬁc era of formal colonial rule over Africa has now ended.
However, it is instructive that up to this day the term imposition (or its
synonyms) remains the key word when discerning African leaders and
scholars describe the African continent’s relationship to international
institutions or to the North. For example, as Nigerian President Olusegun
Obasanjo, a key African leader, has recently noted:

when we [Africans] thought we had regained control of our destiny, and when
we believed that we had earned our rights to join the rest of the world as equal
partners and discuss mutual co-operation on basis of equitability, we
discovered that the position of our continent in the world order had been
disadvantageously ﬁxed and predetermined by numerous factors which, for want
of a better description, we call colonial legacies.32

As remarkably, a diverse group of African scholars such as Michael Chege,
George Ayittey and Joe Oloka-Onyango have over the past decade or so
expressed similar views about the status of African states and peoples as less
than full actors/partners on the global plane, and have bemoaned the entailed
denial of African agency to a highly signiﬁcant degree. While Chege has
long dreamed of the day when African societies might ‘graduate from

being passive recipients of charity to full actors in global politics and
economics’,33 Ayittey has more recently chided the World Bank for not
taking more steps to ‘identify and support the initiative of Africans’.34 For
his own part, Oloka-Onyango is convinced that ‘for many [African and
other] developing countries

IMF

prescriptions are in fact edicts giving the

latter little choice and almost no room to maneouvre’.35 What is more, even
the recent EU Strategy for Africa bemoans the tendency for powerful
outsiders to negate and over-circumscribe African agency. That document
declares quite clearly (and thus commendably) that ‘development policies and
strategies cannot be imposed [on African societies] from the outside’.36
In terms of predicting the orientation of future international law in this
respect, at a minimum there is as yet insuﬃcient cause for near or mediumterm optimism. As BS Chimni has shown, if much care is not taken, the
ongoing, less formal, less extensive and less suﬀocating processes via which
international law and institutions (usually dominated by the more powerful
countries of the North) impose upon, or at least exert strong compliance
pressure on, African and other Third World states, risks being transformed
into a more formal, more extensive, and more suﬀocating global regime that is
akin in many important respects to the systems of colonial rule that severely
constricted African agency in the 19th and 20th centuries.37 As he has put it:

A network of economic, social and political IIs [international institutions] has

been established or repositioned, at the initiative of the ﬁrst world, and together
they constitute a nascent global state whose function is to realize the interests of
transnational capital and powerful states in the international system to the
disadvantage of third world states and peoples. The evolving global state
formation may therefore be described as having an imperial character.38

In my own view this assessment of the direction in which the international
legal order is moving and is likely to continue to move receives much support
from the example of the way in which the framework economic governance of
African peoples and of the vast majority of the other Third World countries
has been all but seized by certain

IFIs,

institutions that are clearly and

extensively dominated by a small number of the most powerful countries of
the North. As I argued not too long ago, it is now clear to most critical
observers that the framework governance of African societies has now been
eﬀectively relocated to IFIs and certain key countries of the North.39 It has, in
other words, been externalised.40 As economically weak as almost all of them
are, African countries which want and need to maintain their creditworthiness—a minimum requirement for participation in the international
economy—must come to terms with a largely predetermined set of policies
imposed upon them by a loose but cohesive consortium made up of the IMF,
World Bank and key G8 countries (and their banks).41 In almost all cases,
these African countries are required to remove social subsidies, privatise key
industries and retrench signiﬁcant proportions of their public employees.42

Regardless of one’s view about the reasonableness or otherwise of these
policies, the point that is being made here is that, despite the usual
declarations about these policies being ‘home grown’, they have in almost
every case been imposed by this IMF-led consortium.43
This fact of the existence of a ﬁgurative noose around the necks of most
African policy makers and the denial of African agency in the formulation of
broad economic policies for their societies is not negated by evidence of the
existence of inevitably minor African input into the constitution of the
domestic versions of these policies. The fact that framework economic
documents like those outlining the New Economic Partnership for Africa’s
Development (NEPAD) and the Nigerian

NEEDS

seem, on the surface, to have

been conceived by African leaders themselves, does not at all disprove the
argument being made here. For example, upon closer examination, the
NEPAD

document reﬂects many of the same neoliberal economic assumptions

and tenets that are favoured by the IFIs. As James Gathii has correctly noted,
NEPAD

adopts the same kinds of market-based development strategies that

are highly recommended by the
fact that

NEPAD

IMF

to African countries.44 Except for the

makes a little more provision for the accommodation of

some of the anticipated ‘losers’ in the implementation of the
economic reforms it endorses, the

NEPAD

IMF-style

document could easily have been

written in an early to mid-1990s, or even in a contemporary,

IMF

or World

Bank oﬃce in Washington.45 It is no wonder then that the IMF has endorsed

NEPAD

quite eﬀusively.46

Similarly, the NEEDS document reproduces every central tenet of the IMF’s
and World Bank’s requirements for certifying a country to its creditors as
being engaged in meaningful reform. Indeed, as Sam Amadi has noted, ‘a
critical reading of the entire [NEEDS] document shows that it still keeps faith
with the broad framework of neo-liberal market-oriented reform which the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund strongly endorse’.47
Another reason for concluding that the NEEDS document is largely a product
of substantial

IFI

endorsement of

pressure on the Nigerian government is the precipitate

NEEDS

by the

IMF

and the World Bank.48 What is more, the

continued endorsement by the IMF and the World Bank of the NEEDS-driven
civil service retrenchment or ‘right-sizing’, and of the massive fuel price
increases that have been implemented in Nigeria, reﬂects the conformity of
this overall economic governance framework with the

IMF’s

and World

Bank’s own policy prescriptions for Nigeria.49 Similarly, while noting some
of the diﬃculties associated with its implementation, the

IMF

has still

described the current government’s overall economic reform programme
as ‘commendable’.50 It also described the retrenchment of 17 000 workers
resulting from the implementation of this same economic ‘restructuring’
agenda as ‘progress’.51 All these comments point to the

IMF’s

over-

all satisfaction with Nigeria’s implementation of the same kind of broad
economic reform agenda that it has routinely insisted the country adopt. It is

therefore only reasonable to conclude from this examination of the
authorship of both NEPAD and NEEDS that, in most cases, even the presumed
African authors of these supposedly ‘home grown’ documents have, at the
very least, been constrained by the pressure exerted over most African states
by the key IFIs. It can therefore be reasonably argued that these documents
also exemplify the substantial, if partial, erasure of the agency of Africans in
their own framework governance. If such key economic policy frameworks
have, in essence, been largely formulated by

IFIs

and the countries of the

North that dominate these institutions, thereby eﬀectively removing key
decisions from the realm of local decision making, is there still a possibility
for engagement in meaningful popular politics at the domestic level? Is it still
possible for African peoples to chart their own futures and to self-constitute;
at least to the extent that is possible in the more powerful states of the North?
There is little reason, if any, to believe that the answers to these questions
will be positive in the near or medium-term future. There is also little reason
to suppose that the countries of the North that currently dominate our global
order will willingly concede to Africans the level of agency that they desire.
Indeed, it would seem that Africans will be lucky to retain even the low levels
of agency that they are now allowed under the current international legal
order. Thus, unless a critical mass of African societies is able to acquire
substantially more global socioeconomic and political power and/or to
become better able to resist those aspects of our current and future global
circumstance which tend to disadvantage African peoples, the African

continent of the future will, under the watchful eyes of international law,
remain in its historically subordinated global position.

On resistance
If the resistance of African societies to certain aspects of the international
legal order will be central to Africa’s escape in the near and medium-term
future from the clutches of gross poverty and disadvantage, then the extent to
which that future order is likely to be transformed by such resistance matters
much. So do the forms that such resistance must take if it is to be eﬀective. As
noted in the introduction to this article, the concept of resistance that is
deployed here draws on the separate writings of Richard Falk and
Balakrishnan Rajagopal. As such, the extant discussion focuses not merely
on the dissent expressed by African leaders with respect to the nature of the
international legal order, but also on the resistance mounted by African
peoples, especially as manifested in the eﬀorts of those social movements that
engage in pro-African struggles on the international plane.
An assessment of the extent to which future international law is likely to
allow the necessary room for African resistance to its more pernicious aspects
can be either more or less optimistic. For instance, at the less optimistic end
of the spectrum Joel Ngugi has argued that international law is so
problematic for the struggle of African and other Third World peoples that
it cannot be reformed from the inside.52 To Ngugi the entire episteme that

grounds international law is so heavily biased in favour of a Eurocentric
world-view that it ought to be abandoned by African and other Third World
peoples.53 In his view third world peoples ought to ‘build an alternative
oppositional template from which to address the problem of domination in
international law’.54 However, scholars such as Makau Mutua and BS
Chimni are somewhat more optimistic. As critical as he is of the anti-African
bias of much of international law, Mutua’s work is nevertheless characterised
by a certain faith in the possibility, under certain circumstances, of
meaningful, even if not entirely satisfactory, reform, however remote this
possibility.55 For his own part, while not naı¨ ve about the inherent
limitations of this approach, Chimni is as convinced of the possibility
of internal international legal reconstruction, and even chides Third World
scholars for not doing more towards the formulation of alternative
international law futures.56
Ngugi’s relative pessimism about the possibility of fundamental proAfrican reform within the international legal order as it is currently
constituted is quite understandable given the historical failure of most Third
World attempts at the deep transformation of the global order. For example,
the attempt in the 1960s and 1970s by African and other Third World states
to promote what they referred to as a ‘New International Economic Order’
was, for the most part, defeated by the inﬂexibility on this question of most of
the more powerful Northern states.57 And, as has already been shown in this

article, current attempts by a transnational coalition to secure meaningful
debt relief and the elimination of trade-distorting agricultural subsidies have
also not met with the level of success that African peoples desire.
Yet there is also countervailing evidence of the possibility, under certain
conditions, of African and Third World success in pushing through a
measure of reform. Even the two African and Third World campaigns for the
elimination of agricultural subsidies and in favour of debt relief that are
mentioned above have met with some success. Thus not all the attempts by
African and other Third World peoples to reform or transform the
international legal order can be said to have failed in large measure. For
example, it is hard to argue that the struggle to rid the African continent of
the scourge of formal and direct colonisation has not met with meaningful,
even if not complete, success.58 Despite the continuing existence of indirect
forms of external control over Africa, few if any existing global regimes equal
the direct and suﬀocating brutality of the formal colonialism that African
peoples have now mostly escaped. Second, the epic (African-led) campaign to
reform the relevant world trade rules so as to allow Third World peoples far
more access to much cheaper essential (especially HIV/AIDS) medications has
deﬁnitely not failed.59 Despite continuing squabbles over the legal character
of the Doha Declaration, which records the concessions won by African and
other Third World states in this connection, it is now a widely established
principle that the relevant global patent protection rules can and ought to be
broken in order to provide ready access to cheap life-saving essential drugs to

the poorer peoples of the world; a large percentage of whom live on the
African continent.60
In the two examples above the pressure exerted by a coalition of actors that
included African leaders, African social movements and/or transnational
social movements, was central to the substantial, albeit still limited, success
enjoyed in pushing through a pro-African agenda on the global socio-legal
stage. In the ﬁrst case, that is the anti-colonial movement, such pressure was
largely exerted by an African mass social movement that included both
African leaders and peoples. In the second example, pressure originated from
a (sometimes virtual and at times actual) transnational coalition that was
composed of African leaders and activists, as well as progressive forces in the
North.61 As limited as their success has tended to be, almost all of the other
modestly fruitful struggles to alter the nature of the contemporary
international legal order that have beneﬁted Africans and other Third World
peoples have been led or highly supported by coalitions of Third World social
movements, progressive Northern forces and Third World and other
sympathetic political leaders.62 As Rajagopal has correctly noted, from the
successful conclusion of the Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Landmines, through the creation of the World Bank Inspection Panels, to the
establishment of the World Commission on Dams, concerted Third World
and Northern social movement alliances and action have helped drive some
notable state-sanctioned changes at the global level.63

It seems therefore that the eﬀorts of African and other Third World forces
at resisting and rewriting aspects of international law that they view with
disfavour have met with meaningful success when those struggles have
involved a coalition of African and other Third World leaders and proAfrican social movements.64 Another key feature of these more successful
struggles for greater African dignity at the global level has been the
deployment of the added power created when the movement takes on a
transnational character.65 If these two observations are as correct as I think
they are, then they are suggestive of the kinds of strategies that might work in
the future for those African peoples who are concerned to resist successfully
the aspects of future international law that negatively aﬀect them. Without at
all diminishing the continuing relevance of the African state as a global-level
vehicle for expressing the dissent of African peoples, it seems that a
transnationally focused and social movement-sensitive strategy is imperative if
African peoples are more eﬀectively to resist their subordination in the
international legal order of the near or medium-term future.66 This
imperative is reinforced by existing, if cutting-edge, currents in international
relations. As Rajagopal has shown, well organised social movements in
Africa and the rest of the Third World have at times formed moderately
eﬀective alliances with sympathetic Northern forces that have sometimes
produced a meaningful measure of desired change in the global order.67
Thus, inasmuch as future international law is not likely to allow much

room for African leaders and peoples to foster fundamental change in the
global order of the time, the more eﬀective the strategies deployed by African
peoples, the more appreciable the level of transformation that they can
initiate. And, as has been argued in this section, the more the strategies of
resistance or dissent adopted by Africans resemble the kinds of transnational
social movement strategies that seem to have increased their chances of
success in the past, the more they will be able to shape the character of future
international law.
Despite my recommendation of the use of a combination of both statebased and social movement-style strategies as a way of enhancing the chances
of African activism to eﬀect change in the global order, let me end this
section by sounding two notes of caution. First of all, I am of course aware
that, as Joel Ngugi has argued, as long the resistance launched by Third
World peoples has not been viewed as likely to lead to the fundamental
reorganisation of the world order, international law has historically been
quite happy to ‘donate the power of dissent’ to African and other Third
World peoples while continuing to bequeath to the North the ‘prescription
of solutions to world problems’.68 Nevertheless, given the historical
experience of African peoples of colonial subjugation in the 18th and 19th
centuries and continuing marginally to this day, their very ability to exercise
the power of dissent/resistance is in and of itself an act of liberation. What is
more, as already pointed out, suﬃcient evidence already exists to warrant a
highly cautious, but nevertheless more optimistic, assessment of the

contingent possibility of securing certain modest concessions that can
markedly improve the lot of a large percentage of Africans in short order.
Most African peoples simply do not have the luxury of waiting interminably,
it seems, for the day that they can eﬀectively de-couple themselves from the
international legal order. And, as I have already argued, the possibility that
their resistance will bear some fruit is brightened appreciably when
transnationally focused and social movement-sensitive strategies are
deployed by African leaders and peoples. This is not to say, of course, that
the power of dissent conceded to African peoples by international law is not a
signiﬁcantly limited one. It is acknowledged that on its own the exercise of
this power of dissent is unlikely to lead to the fundamental transformation of
the world order. Though subject to change, the countervailing power
asymmetries are simply too great at present.
Second, I am also aware of, and agree with, Upendra Baxi’s cautionary
tale regarding the Janus-faced quality of the social movement ‘shell’. Like
any other shell, this particular kind of shell can of course be ﬁlled with either
‘good’ desire or ‘bad’ intent.69 For instance, as Baxi argues, proponents of
hate speech or women’s subordination can create and have sometimes
created and fostered their own social movements.70 These are not movements
likely to advantage Third World peoples.

As such, wearing a social

movement garb, or even taking on a social movement character, will not
on its own ensure that a particular reformist or transformative coalition (of
the kind recommended here) will promote positions that advantage Third

World peoples. Having said that, the point being made in this section is that,
in order to experience signiﬁcantly greater success, ‘good’ Third World
international law reform or transformation projects will, it seems, need to
work both transnationally and in a social movement mode. The fact that
‘bad’ social movements can also deploy this strategy should not on its own
deter these ‘good’ movements from adopting this otherwise ethical strategy
that signiﬁcantly increases their chances of success.

Conclusion
In conclusion, it is useful to provide an overall assessment of the vision of the
broad position that most African peoples are likely to occupy in the
international legal order of the near and medium-term future presented in
this article. This less than clairvoyant reading of that future order’s likely
overall posture is mediated by the prism of that order’s existing historical
record with regard to its stance on the radical reduction of poverty in Africa,
on the markedly increased promotion of local agency on the continent, and
on the African resistance to some of its dictates.
Seen through these prisms, international law is unlikely to undergo any
really far-reaching or fundamental transformation. It is unlikely to be
transformed in the near or medium-term future into a normative order that
serves African people much more eﬀectively. Future international law is
unlikely to be altered so as to as foster the kind of much more equitable

world economic order that is envisaged by the campaigns of African (and
other Third World) peoples for the elimination of the agricultural subsidies
that key countries in the North provide to many of their farmers. Similarly,
future international law is unlikely to function in a way that greatly enhances
the self-constitution of African societies. As long as it remains relatively silent
about or even tends to promote the denial of African agency in the
governance of Africa’s own societies, that order will for the most part remain
insensitive to the yearnings of African peoples to exercise more control over
their own lives than in past and current global orders.
What is more, without more of a focus on deploying the kinds of
transnational social movement strategies that have increased their chances of
success in the past, African leaders and peoples (like most of their likeminded cohort in the rest of the Third World) are unlikely to improve upon
their historically suboptimal record in signiﬁcantly aﬀecting the play of
global politics in ways that will impact much more eﬀectively on the lives
of most of the continent’s peoples. Yet even the adoption of this kind of
innovative strategy is unlikely to win for Africans the kind of fundamental
concessions from the far more powerful states of the North that are necessary
for Africa and our entire global circumstance to experience speedy and
sustainable change. Thus, absent that near or medium-term possibility, and
barring any sudden deep structural changes in current ideational, economic,
political and social power asymmetries in the global order, change will
continue to be administered on Africa (and not really by Africans). And such

change will continue to drip onto the continent in rather small (but hopefully
incremental) doses.
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